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ABSTRACT
A STRUCTURE CONDUCT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE ZIMBABWE 
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY EXCHANGE
Farmers, agribusiness leaders and government policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa are grappling with 
the difficult question of how to restructure their agricultural input and output marketing systems in order 
to expand the role of the private sector, focus public activities on core functions and improve access by 
smallholders. In Zimbabwe the concept of an agricultural commodity exchange came about with the 
government policy o f structural adjustment and led commercial farmers to set up ZIMACE to provide a 
mechanism for price discovery and coordinating the exchange of agricultural commodities. Given the 
expanding volume o f agricultural commodities traded through ZIMACE, ZIMACE is now a major player 
in domestic, regional and international markets. The most significant development is that smallholder 
farmers are now basing their prices on ZIMACE. A growing hypothesis is that if  smallholders use 
ZIMACE as a price discovery mechanism then they will not be cheated into accepting low prices 
compared with if they bargain individually with traders. However, there is a lack o f information on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of ZIMACE in carrying out marketing functions and the potential benefits to 
smallholders, especially in marginal areas. This study reviews literature on the mechanisms for  
discovering agricultural prices, mechanisms for coordinating exchange of agricultural commodities, and 
agricultural commodity exchanges in Africa. The study also reviews empirical methods fo r analysing 
agricultural commodity markets and develops a conceptual framework for analysing the structure, 
conduct and performance of ZIMACE. The conceptual framework is used to analyse basic conditions, 
contestability o f the market and pricing efficiency.
The study found that ZIMACE is organised as an exchange. Although there is high market 
concentration, ZIMACE is a contestable market. Because of contestability participants engage in price 
and non-price competitive behaviour and because o f market competition there is spatial pricing efficiency 
and correlation o f the ZIMA CE market with other markets. Granger causality tests indicate that ZIMA CE 
is a price leader in terms o f price discovery and performs well in the transmission of price information. 
The study recommends that the Government enact legislation to enforce grain handlers including GMB to 
submit price information which should be made public. In addition, grain commodity brokers are 
recommended to improve transparency in the price discovery process by not engaging in unethical 
business practices. Smallholder farmers are recommended to engage the services o f brokers and 
consolidate their produce in different areas to obtain better access to ZIMACE. Finally it is recommended 
that ZIMACE supports the development of infrastructure facilities to effectively link production centres 
with market centres and improve market knowledge by providing accurate and timely public market 
information to all farming sectors.
1. INTRODUCTION
Farmers, agribusiness leaders and government policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa are grappling with the 
difficult question of how to restructure their agricultural input and output marketing systems in order to 
expand the role of the private sector, focus public activities on core functions and improve access by 
smallholders. Thirty of the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently implementing International 
Monetary Fund - World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programs (World Bank Annual Report, 1998). 
The economic reforms are focusing on liberalisation and privatisation of agricultural input supply and farm 
output markets to get agriculture moving as an engine of economic growth. Zimbabwe has implemented an 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme since 1991 to remove pervasive government ownership and 
control of the economy and transfer responsibilities for managing farm input supply and commodity 
marketing to the private organisations and market forces (Takavarasha, 1994). These reforms have focused 
on the dissolution of marketing boards, lifting of farm input and output price controls, and removal of foreign 
exchange allocation systems. To date, the Government has privatised the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) and 
the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), and it is now privatising the Cold Storage Commission (CSC). 
Although the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) has not been privatised, it is now required to operate on 
commercial lines.
The concept of an agricultural commodity exchange came about with the government policy of 
structural adjustment and led commercial farmers to set up the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange 
(ZIMACE), to provide a mechanism for price discovery and coordinating the exchange of agricultural 
commodities, making Zimbabwe the first country in Africa to have a commodity exchange. ZIMACE has 
taken off substantially since it was formed and the volume of trade has increased from a standstill position 
over the years. During the 1997/1998 agricultural marketing year, a total of 224531 tonnes of agricultural 
commodities were traded through the exchange compared with 107 thousand tonnes for the same period in 
1996/1997. In terms of value about ZS759 million of commodities in real terms were traded through 
ZIMACE during the period April to January 1999 compared toZ$267 million for the same period in 1998, 
roughly three times as much as the next best year achieved by the exchange (The ZIMACE Trader, 1998).
Given the expanding volume of agricultural commodities traded through ZIMACE, ZIMACE is now 
a major player in domestic, regional and international markets. Although ZIMACE started as a holding 
company with a single broker providing a market for products, it has expanded over the years and now 
includes buyers and endusers. Farm leaders, agribusiness managers and policy makers are beginning to 
understand the details of the concept and how the organised exchange functions.
The most significant development is that smallholder farmers are now basing their prices on 
ZIMACE. A growing hypothesis is that if smallholders use ZIMACE as a price discovery mechanism then 
they will not be cheated into accepting low prices compared with if they bargain individually with traders. 
However, there is a lack of information on the efficiency and effectiveness of ZIMACE in carrying out 
marketing functions and the potential benefits to smallholders, especially in marginal areas. Smallholders 
face difficulties acquiring information on agricultural commodity prices, moving commodities from 
production to the urban market centres and obtaining cash to meet their immediate requirements. A major 
challenge for smallholder farmers is to appreciate that prices can fall as quickly as they can rise. ZIMACE 
has encouraged farmers to sell through the exchange and this is beginning to happen. However, farmers lack 
the ability to grow commodities and market them at an appropriate time. This study investigates the impact 
of ZIMACE on smallholder marketing and the potential benefits o f smallholder farmers' participation 
especially in obtaining timely access to markets and influencing the rules of trading through the commodity 
exchange to their benefit. For example, although smallholder fanners can sell their produce using brokers 
through ZIMACE they can still be cheated in accepting low prices if they have a lack o f information about 
prices and alternative buyers. Smallholders are cognisant o f the need to be updated and are making enquiries 
by telephoning and visiting the ZIMACE.
ZIMACE disseminates price information through AGRITEX, through a DANIDA-funded 
Agricultural Price Marketing Information System project in the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, and
5through the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) who also disseminate information to neighbouring 
smallholder farmers. The ZIMACE also disseminates information through the radio and television and its 
trade association journal, the ZIMACE Trader. In addition farmers are beginning to sell through forward 
contracts through the exchange. But forward contracts are still poorly understood by largescale• and 
smallholder farmers because of the past history of a single channel of delivery.
This study carries out a structure, conduct, performance analysis of ZIMACE to obtain insights on 
how its operations may be broadened inorder to expand benefits to smallholders. Recently leaders of 
smallholder farmers have expressed concern with ZIMACE and are exploring opportunities to establish an 
alternative agricultural commodity exchange for smallholders (Zhou, 1999). This raises the question of 
whether or not commodity exchanges offer benefits to smallholders, which exchanges are appropriate for 
smallholders, and what government policies need to be in place to underpin the establishment and 
management of beneficial commodity exchanges. The liberalisation of agricultural markets implies accepting 
potentially substantial variation in prices across time. This price variation is necessary if the private sector is 
to perform its marketing functions. The knowledge gained through the analysis of prices can help alleviate 
possible negative attitudes in the public sector towards markets and marketing processes in general. There is 
a need to provide solid and research based information to policymakers to help formulate informed decisions.
2. STUDY METHODS AND DATA SOURCES
The literature review has shown that analysis of agricultural commodity markets requires a broad and 
comprehensive conceptual framework that captures relationships between market organisation, behaviuor of 
participants, performance and government polices. This developed a conceptual framework derived from the 
subsector approach for analysing agricultural markets. The conceptual framework is used to derive 
empirically testable hypotheses about the organisation and performance of ZIMACE and the maize subsector 
in Zimbabwe. An agricultural subsector refers to an interdependent array of organizations, resources, laws, 
and institutions involved in the production, processing, distribution and consumption of an agricultural input 
or commodity. The subsector framework used in this paper is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
framework or the Industrial Organization theory, of agricultural markets.
The Structure-Conduct-Performance framework posits that in an agricultural market subsector there 
are certain basic conditions that determine its structure. In turn, structure determines the behaviour of 
organizations engaged in agricultural commodity assembly, transport, storage, processing, wholesaling and 
retailing. Finally, the behaviour of market participants determines the performance of the industry. 
Government policies are ubiquitous and influence basic conditions, structure, conduct, and performance of 
the agricultural commodity market.
Basic conditions are classified on the supply and demand side. Basic conditions on the supply side 
include the legal and regulatory framework governing agricultural commodity marketing activities such as 
grades and standards, location of raw materials such as the processed farm grain, nature of technology, 
durability of the product, the value to weight ratio of the product, and time pattern of production. Basic 
conditions on the demand side include price and income elasticities of demand, availability of substitute 
products, rate of growth of demand, cyclical and seasonal demand variability, product marketing 
characteristics and purchase methods employed by buyers.
Market structure includes characteristics that influence the degree of competition in the market such 
as the number and size distribution of marketing firms, the degree of product differentiation among sellers' 
products, the presence or absence of barriers to entry of new firms, the degree to which firms are vertically 
integrated from assembly of raw grain to retail distribution, and the extent of firms' product line 
diversification and conglomerateness. Even where there are few firms in the market, the market can still be 
competitive if there is contestability.
Contestability attempts to specify the conditions under which oligopolies can be expected to have
6pricing outcomes that approximate those for competitive markets. Therefore a contestable market is 
allocatively efficient without relying on the assumption of large numbers. The competitive result is realised 
because of the threat of entry (Kilmer and Ambruster, 1987). A perfectly contestable market is one in which 
entry and exit are absolutely costless. In such a market, competitive pressures supplied by the perpetual 
threat of entry, as well as by the presence of actual current rivals, can prevent monopoly behaviour. The 
theory o f contestable markets suggests that even if there is only one seller, the seller may be forced to act as 
if there were many sellers and the market becomes a competitive industry.
Market conduct includes methods employed by market participants in determining prices and output, 
product line and advertising strategies, market channel activities, research and developent commitments, 
legal tactics, lobbying, public relations, and conglomerate behaviour. Market performance refers to "how 
well the industry does the things" that society might reasonably expect it to do, including productive 
efficiency, pricing efficiency, progressiveness, employment and equity. Government policies include 
government programs on standards, product labelling, contract enforcement, infrastructure, price controls, 
licensing of traders and market regulations. Also government macroeconomic policies such as money supply 
and interest rates; fiscal policies such as public expenditure and taxation; trade policies such as tariffs and 
import and export controls; and foreign direct investments.
Market conduct defines the conditions which make possible exploitative relationships between 
buyers, sellers and brokers. The following guidelines will be used to analyse the elements o f market conduct; 
available marketing channels, availability of price information and its impact on prevailing prices, buying 
and selling practices in place, distribution channels in place and the price setting behaviour. One can use 
information on structure and conduct and the nature of maize grain price transmission through theZIMACE 
to infer about the pricing efficiency of the maize marketing system and the competitiveness of the markets.
The subsector approach broadens the structure-conduct-performance framework beyond the 
boundaries of the agricultural commodity marketing organisations and assesses structure and conduct 
vertically and horizontally at all functional levels from research and development through farm input supply, 
assembly of farm output, transportation, storage, processing, wholesaling and retailing. This is because 
structure and behavior at one level in the system influence those in other functional levels. The framework 
facilitates analysis of vertical coordination of the whole subsector, diagnosis o f constraints on better 
performance, and identification of opportunities for and barriers to improved economic performance.
Although maize prices are discovered by the interaction o f numerous market agents trading in 
several satellite markets dispersed all over the country, it is arbitrage in the principal ZIMACE market that 
will exert considerable influence in the local formation of maize price. The ZIMACE as a private market is 
expected to exert the most significant influence in discovering maize prices. In negotiating prices in forward 
contracts with farmers and larger traders at the ZIMACE, ZIMACE prices have been used as reference 
prices. It is thus hypothesised that the formation o f local maize prices is centred around the ZIMACE 
meaning that the ZIMACE is expected to lead the local formation o f maize prices and after some time lags, 
prices at the district level will be discovered. Since market integration is concerned about the behaviour of 
prices across spatially differentiated markets over time, the use o f a time series model in the study is most 
pertinent The structure and conduct of ZIMACE participants have a direct implication for the nature of 
maize grain price relationships between different markets.
This study uses econometric modelling to test the pricing efficiency o f ZIMACE market integration with 
other maize markets and investigate price transmission. The first approach uses bivariate correlation. Price 
correlations measure the co-movements of prices that underlie the intuitive idea o f market integration. 
Correlation of prices at different markets is related to the idea that integrated markets exhibit prices that 
move together. Parallel movements in prices can occur for several reasons other than the integration of 
markets for example due to inflation or seasonal influences. In order to eliminate some o f these spurious
1/
correlations, price differences instead of price levels are sometimes considered in computing correlation 
coefficients (Scott, 1995). The second approach uses seven price series to investigate the extent of market 
integration of the private maize grain markets with the Grain Marketing Board. Time series analysis of price 
data is conducted to tackle the issue of the relationship of prices in different markets.
The simplest tests of cointegration which use the Engle-Granger two-step procedure were applied in 
this study. If two markets are very far away from each other, the lack* of cointegration may be due to 
transportation costs. Thus the ZIMACE market will be considered together with Mbare Musika and 
Chikwanha markets. The Chikukwa, Mhondoro and Guruve markets will also be considered as rural market 
separated from the urban markets by distance.
Furthermore causality of prices was investigated to give an insight on the price determination process 
and is a necessary' step in investigating price transmission. To address this question the Granger Causality 
test is used. Testing causality in the Granger sense involves using F-tests to test whether lagged information 
on a variable Y provides any statistically significant information about a variable X in the presence o f lagged 
X. If not, then " Y does not Granger cause X".
3. RESULTS
The literature review and conceptual framework have identified the institutional pre-conditions for an 
exchange as key variables that influence structure of markets, behaviour o f markets and ultimate 
performance. Primary and secondary data sources were used toanalyse the organisation o f ZIMACE, 
focusing on basic conditions and market characteristics that influence the behaviour o f its participants. The 
results included: interview responses to questions that collected trader perspectives about institutional 
characteristics of ZIMACE, barriers to entry, market structure and competitiveness.
3.1 Institutional Characteristics O f Zimace
The ZIMACE operates within an institutional environment consisting of a set of fundamental political, social 
and legal ground rules. These rules establish a basis for exchange, for example, standards, licensing rules, 
laws of contract and liability, company and cooperative laws and 'fair1 trading conventions. Rules and 
conventions specifying entry conditions and boundaries on cooperative and competitive practices are also 
important in facilitating exchange and coordination of the ZIMACE activities.
3 3  Barriers To Entry
Traders were asked to rank main barriers to entry for new firms and threat of entry by new firms and threat of 
entry by regional and international firms. Table 4.2 shows that the major barriers to entry in decreasing order 
of listed importance are the cost o f seat on ZIMACE for one to be a member broker followed by annual 
subscription fees.
Table 2: Barriers to Entry
Barriers to Entry Frequency of Reporting by Brokers
(%)
I. Cost o f Seat on ZIMACE 100
2. Annual Subscription Fees 30
The major barrier to entry revealed in the study was the prohibitively high costs for a seal on ZIMACE for 
one to become a member. In addition to the joining fee (cost of seat) members are also required to pay an
8annual subscription fee. This requirement presents a major barrier to direct participation by small traders and 
smallholders. A seat on the ZIMACE for one to become a broker is very expensive. Membership requires a 
joining fee of USSIO 000. In addition to the joining fee, members pay an annual subscription fee which is 
reviewed annually. In 1996 the fee was ZS20 000, which was doubled in 1997. This requirement presents a 
major barrier to direct participation by small traders and farmers.
33  Structural Characteristics Of ZIMACE
Research results presented in Table 3 show a summary of the structural characteristics of ZIMACE.
3.3.1 Composition o f ZIMACE Members
The exchange is composed of 18 members, 75 percent of which are broking members and the remaining 25 
percent are non-broking members. Broking members exclusively deal on the ZIMACE. The non-broking 
members can buy and sell elsewhere other than the ZIMACE.
3.3.2 Firm Sizes and Conglomerateness
The reseach fundings showed that ZIMACE broking members ranked as predominantly large business firms 
in relation to the other firms in their line of operation. The size distribution of numbers of buyers and sellers 
was measured by the volumes handled by each buyer or seller and revenue realised. The concentration ratio 
was computed as follows:
. . .  . Amount o f maize handled by ZIMACE membersMarket share = ------------------------------------------------------------------
National Grain Sales in one year
Table 3: General Characteristics of ZIMACE Members
Characteristic Group
Broking ZIMACE 
member (Percent)
Non-broking ZIMACE 
member (Percent)
Total
Size
small 12.5 0 12.5
medium 12.5 12.5 25
large 37.5 25 62.5
Year in operation
less than I 12.5 0 12.5
1 -5 50 0 50
6 - 10 12.5 0 12.5
11 and above 0 25 25
Firm Legal Status
Private Limited 50 12.5 62.5
Sole proprietor - - -
Parastatal - 12.5 12.5
Cooperative 12.5 - 12.5
Public Limited - 12.5 12.5
9Part of a group of Firms?
Yes 25 12.5 37.5
No 37.5 25 62.5
Local Subsidiary of an Interna 
Parent?
Yes 12.5 25 37.5
No 50 12.5 62.5
Activities of Firm in addition to
trading
Assembler
Yes 12.5 25 37.5
No 50 12.5 62.5
Transporter
Yes 25 12.5 37.5
No 37.5 25 62.5
Broker
Yes 50 25 75
No 12.5 12.5 25
Exporter
Yes 50 25 75
No 12.5 12.5 25
Processor
Yes 25 37.5 62.5
No 37.5 0 37.5
Wholesaler
Yes
No - - .
Retailer
Yes 0 25 25
No 62.5 12.5 75
Importer
Yes 50 25 75
No 12.5 12.5 25
The results of market concentration analysis are shown in the Table 4 below. The results indicate that 40 
percent of actively trading broking members control 70 percent of maize grain sales through the ZfMACE. 
Literature shows that about 10 percent of national maize grain sales go through the ZIMACE. Large 
quantities of grain are brought to the market by a few large scale commercial farmers. Thus there is a 
concentration of grain marketing by a few large market agents. Market concentration is a strong indication of 
non competitive pricing behaviour and of inefficient market performance. The presents of few large market 
agents within a defined market boundary suggests concentration of market power.
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Table 4: ZIMACE M arket Concentration
Firm C o n cen tra tio n  Ratio
A 0.3
B 0.2
C 0.1
D 0.1
However, concentration alone does not imply non-competitive behaviour, because there are other alternative 
marketing channels and ZIMACE only handies 10 percent of the total maize produced in the country.
3.3.3 Years o f Operation o f ZIMA CE Members
Not surprisingly the majority (50 percent) fell in the 1994 to 1999 bracket, which coincides with the period 
when markets were liberalised. Nearly 70 percent of those who responded indicated that their businesses 
were growing, 10 percent reported their businesses as in the initial stages, whilst 30 percent characterised 
their business as mature.
3.3.4 Principal Maize Marketing Channels
Based on information gathered during the rapid appraisal as well as the data collected through the survey of 
marketing agents, a fairly accurate picture of the structure of the marketing system was developed. The main 
market participants were identified. Currently the ZIMACE marketing system is dominated by four major 
brokers.
Producers
armers
Processors
ZIMACE
CO
NS
UM
ERS
Regional
Markets
Figure 1. Principal Maize Marketing Channels for maize traded through ZIMACE
The communal or commercial maize grower is the first link in the marketing chain. The producers are linked 
to the ZIMACE by brokers who work for commission on the producers' behalf and the product is passed on 
directly to the processor or to the processor or regional market through other brokers or traders. The last link 
in the marketing chain is the consumer. The marketing chain for maize grain is shown in greater detail in 
Figure 2, which indicate that there are alternative maize marketing channels in the maize grain subsector that 
compete with the ZIMACE channel.
3.3.5 Competitiveness o f Firms Operating through ZIMACE
An analysis of existing patterns of competition for actively trading companies can be illustrated in Table 5 
below.
Table 5. Competitor Mapping for ZIMACE Members
Domestic Firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 * * * * * * * * *
2 * ♦ * * *
3 * * * * * *
4 * * * * * * *
5 * ♦ * * * * * *
6 * * * ★ * * * * *
7 * * * * * * * *
8 ♦ * * * *
9 * * * * ♦
10 * * ♦ * * * * * *
International Firms
I * *
II * * * *
III *
IV * * * ♦ * * *
Table 5 above on competitor mapping has shown that there is net competition amongst the ZIMACE brokers 
as shown by the density (60 percent) of firms in competition. The existing patterns of competition imply that 
the ZIMACE market is contestable since. Though there are only a few brokers on ZIMACE, there are many 
buyers and sellers of commodities traded on ZIMACE thus forcing the brokers to be contestable.
Taking contestability in the case of ZIMACE, buyers solicit bids from several brokers on the 
exchange and choose the lowest bidder. Competition amongst bidders ensures that the buyer will be served at 
the lowest possible price for a commodity, even though actually one broker will eventually sell the 
commodity to the buyer. There is intense rivalry among existing ZIMACE member brokers.
3.4 MAIZE SUBSECTOR
To further examine the contestability of ZIMACE, characteristics of alternative maize marketing channels in 
the maize subsector are analysed focusing on patterns of interaction, how the nature ofcommodity affects the 
organisation of the system and the rules associated with the system. The survey revealed the existence of a
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complex and well developed marketing system for maize involving a large number of intermediaries and 
comprising many district marketing channels, millers, traders and processors. ZIMACE is also restrained to 
an extent by the number of residual controls in place, particularly in the country's maize market where maize 
farmers cannot enjoy the benefits of a free market because the Grain Marketing Board is still the main buyer 
and as such sets the floor prices and maintains a monopoly of imports and exports.
C om m unal M aize Grain
S u rp lu *  H o u s e h o ld s
D e f ic it  H o u se h o ld s
/K  *
C *ll«cti*e  Foist
Miim -onI vksliittir/nttilw!
C om m ercia l M aize  Grain
1  U rb a n  C o m m e rc ia l 
| M ille rs
Figure  2: N a t iona l  M aize D is tr ibu t ion  Channels
' '  /“D rought R elie f
There are four major marketing channels: sales within villages either from farmer to farmer or from farmer 
through a trader / broker to another farmer; from farmer to collection point to GMB; from farmer to urban 
consumers; and from farmer through ZIMACE to either the commercial millers or other farmers.
3.5 Pricing Methods
Key informants interviewed in this study explained that price is determined on ZIMACE through interaction 
of brokers. Daily personal contact between buyers and sellers takes place at the ZIMACE. A board situated 
on the wall of the exchange reflects the highest bid (buying price), lowest offer (selling price), trade or strike 
prices and forward delivery. Prices are determined by the market. An open market like ZIMACE assures the 
industry that the price is set by the buyer most desperate to buy and thus bid the highest price while it gives 
the seller who needs to sell most urgently the opportunity to offer the product at a price that will move 
his/her product.
Government officials explained that the price range at which maize is traded is that which is 
between the GMB floor and ceiling prices. Wheat and soyabeans prices are determined by supply and 
demand (they are market related), the prices are perceived to move between import and export parity prices. 
The exchange rate is considered in price setting. The brokers outlined the factors considered in price setting 
as follows: supply; location; production costs; and alternative sources of supply. Internally in the country, 
heavy transport costs affect prices, internationally supply in other countries and the distance to and from 
these markets.
According to most respondents, buying prices, selling prices and transport costs are well known to all 
market participants and the ZIMACE plays a part in providing information. The brokers offer a variety of
services to their clients which include a sound marketing plan, frequent market updates, ensuring smooth and 
prompt payment systems and risk management services.
Some buyers prefer to give a higher price for higher tonnage. Some cooperatives in communal areas 
are starting to market commodities in bulk in order to obtain a good price. An open market like ZIMACE 
assures the industry that the price is set by the buyer most desperate to buy and thus bid the highest price 
while it gives the seller who needs to sell most urgently the opportunity to offer the product at a price that 
will move his/her product. The methods that are used to set prices as reported by the respondents are 
indicated in Table 7 below. Around 75 percent of the respondents reported the use of an organised 
commodity exchange (ZIMACE) as the most frequently used method. Confronted with increased 
competition from numerous traders, the brokers / traders are compelled to engage in contract sale involving 
forward contracting in order to secure their own market share. The ZIMACE allows all players in the market 
to judge likely future price movements based on historical prices, likely supply and demand assessments and 
current sentiments. Given the openness and transparency of the market, with no reason to conceal 
confidential deals and trading, the ZIMACE becomes a valuable source of market information.
Table 7: Methods of Price Setting Reported by ZIMACE Members
Method Percent Reporting
Organised Commodity Exchange 75
Collective Bargaining 15
Private Treaty 10
Formula Pricing 0
Administered Pricing 0
There are also non-price factors that are considered by brokers in a bid to secure produce. The study was also 
able to reveal the factors affecting transmission of information across markets and thus trading opportunities. 
Observed unethical practices, lack of information, availability of marketing channels and transportation 
could impede rapid and full transmission of information across markets resulting in poorly integrated 
markets. In the smallholder farming sector transport availability was ranked high as important in affecting 
the potential for exchange of agricultural commodities as shown in Table 8. This has important implications 
as prices may be discounted to cater for transport costs and this may consequently result in an incomplete 
transmission of price changes across markets.
The benefits of these exchanges have occurred through the direct participation by farmers both small 
and large scale. Small scale farmers selling relatively small quantities have benefitted from the engagement 
of traders and cooperatives on the exchange. By locking in positions on the exchange, traders are able to pass 
along more secure price arrangements to farmers for example in forward contracting. By bulking up 
production from small scale farmers, traders and farmer cooperatives have been able to overcome the entry 
barriers to participation that are prohibitively expensive for individual farmers.
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Table 8: Degree of Importance of factors that affect potential for business in the Smallholder Sector
Item O rder of Ranking1 *3 Percent Rating^
| 1 2 3 4
Transport Availability 1 71.4 28.6 0 0
Observed Unethical Practices 2 57.1 14.3 28.6 0
Lack of Information 3 57.1 42.9 0 0
Available Marketing Channels 4 42.9 14.2 42.9 0
Table 9 below indicates the ranking of the factors affecting the potential for business in the commercial 
sector. All the factors were rated as very important. The lack of information is indicated as the most 
impeding factor in affecting the potential for business followed by the available marketing channels and 
observed unethical practices respectively. Transport availability is not considered as a very important factor 
in affecting the potential for business in the communal sector. Sentiments about a trader's involvement in 
unfair pricing or other fraudulent practices is sufficient to discourage farmers from dealing with the broker.
About 75 percent of the brokers reported that they provide transport for smallholders.
Table 9: Degree of Importance of factors that affect potential for business in the Commercial Sector
Item O rder of Ranking-1 Percent Rating4
| 1 2 3 4
Lack of Information 1 100 0 0 0
Available Marketing Channels 2 85.7 14.3 0 0
Observed Unethical Practices 3 71.4 28.6 0 0
Transport Availability 4 57.1 28.6 14.3 0
The analysis has shown that ZIMACE provides an excellent opportunity to discover or test a price.
3.6 Market Channel Activities
The channels through which maize flows and the dynamics of the interaction among market participants in 
discovering maize as it moves through the markets are described.
'The sources are ranked in order of importance with the source ranked I being the most important
'Rating number l=Very important 2=Somewhat Important 3=Not Important 4=Not Applicable
3The sources are ranked in order o f importance with the source ranked I being the most important
4Rating number l=Very Important 2=Somewhat Important 3=Not Important 4=Not Applicable
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Table 10: Sources of Maize Traded through ZIMACE
Source of Maize Percent Reporting
1 Up to 50 percent 51 percent and above
Communal
Commercial
71.6
42.8
28.4
57.2
Generally the broking and non-broking members have access to three main sources of maize grain: 
communal, commercial and import. But imports are utilised to a limited extent by most participants except 
for the GMB. As high as 72 percent of the respondents reported obtaining less than 50 percent of the maize 
grain they handle from the smallholders. The remaining 28 percent obtain more than 50 percent of their 
traded maize from the smallholders. In contrast, less than 43 percent of traders obtain 50 percent or less of 
their maize grain from the commercial sector while roughly 57 percent source more than 51 percent of their 
maize supplies from commercial fanners. Without doubt the bulk of the maize traded on the ZIMACE is 
from commercial fanners. Respondents explained the low percentage of maize obtained from communal 
farmers by the fact that was that many communal area fanners find it difficult to meet the required tonnages.
3.7 Market Information And Research
Table 11 shows that 87.5 percent of respondents reported ZIMACE as a very important source of market 
news. The ZIMACE, communication with competitors and the direct communication with buyers and sellers 
ranked very high. The direct communication with buyers and sellers ZIMACE proved the most important 
source of finding out about trading opportunities given by 100 percent of respondents. The GMB was not 
ranked as an important criterion by most respondents.
Table 11 below lists the sources that the respondents considered to be most significant in finding out 
about possible trading opportunities.
Table 11: Sources of Finding out about Possible Trading Opportunities
Source O rder o P  
ranking
Percentage5 6 Rating
Direct communication with buyers and sellers 1 100 0 0
Communication with competitors 2 87.5 12.5 0
The ZIMACE 3 87.5 12.5 0
The Internet 4 75 25.0 0
Contacts in ministries or marketing boards 5 75 25.0 0
Contacts in the International business community 6 50.0 37.5 12.5
Word of mouth 7 37.5 62.5 0
Tenders for bids published in newspapers 8 25.0 62.5 12.5
GMB 9 12.5 87.5 0
Contacts are usually initiated by the buyers who look for sources of grain. When asked about the sources of
5The sources are ranked in order of importance with the source ranked 1 being the most important
““Ranking number 1= Very Important 2=Somewhat Important 3=Not Important
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finding out about possible trading opportunities most respondents (100 percent) indicated that the most 
important source as being the direct communication with buyers and sellers. It is also noted that market 
information is transmitted across markets freely by word of mouth and 62 percent ranked word of mouth as a 
source of finding out about trading opportunities as somewhat important. So news on price changes is 
obtained from both informal and formal sources. Publicly available trading and market information as only 
about 25 percent of the respondents considered tenders for bids published in newspapers as a very important 
source of finding out about trading opportunities. There is also a significant percentage of respondents that 
use information from their competitors. It is evident that most market information utilised is that from 
ZIMACE and the direct communication with buyers and sellers and thus there is less exposure to price 
manipulation and exploitation. Several factors can be identified as contributing to limiting the possibility of 
price manipulation, namely, contracts and the callover process of the ZIMACE. The fact that ZIMACE 
members are frequently involved in trading it means that they are better able to read and interpret price 
signals.
In order of ranking by the respondents, Producer Organisations followed by ZIMACE ranked as very 
important sources for finding out about legal procedures for trading as indicated in Table 12 below.
Table 12: Sources of Finding out about Legal procedures for Trading
Source
1 1
Order of7 8
Ranking
Percent Rating**
1 2 3
Producer Organisations ( ZFU, CFU, ICFU, AGRITEX etc ) 1 100 0 0
The ZIMACE 2 75.0 12.5 12.5
Analysis done by own firm 3 71.4 14.3 14.3
Direct communication with buyers and sellers 4 50.0 25.0 25.0
Communication with competitors 5 42.9 14.3 42.9
Contacts in ministries or marketing boards 6 28.6 14.3 57.1
Contacts in the International business community 7 28.6 14.3 57.1
Tenders for bids published in newspapers 8 14.3 14.3 71.4
The results confirm that brokers on the ZIMACE link buyers with sellers. They do research on the markets 
and give advice to clients on how to handle the marketing of their crop. One broker is associated with a 
project of an association of fanners outside Gokwe who consolidate small lots of grain inorder to achieve a 
higher price. Farmers normally approach the broker with their crop and discuss prices. Some manufacturers 
(mainly millers) utilise the ZIMACE as a parallel market to buy large quantities of commodities to their best 
advantage.
The heavy reliance on informal sources of information exposes farmers to possible price 
manipulation and exploitation. However, the access of farmers to multiple traders limits the possibility of 
price manipulation. Knowledge about the market through regular consultation with other sources also enables 
farmers and traders to validate price information they receive from another. The frequent and active 
involvement of brokers in trading also enables them to correctly read and interpret market signals and 
translate them into price expectations.
7The sources are ranked in order of importance with the source ranked 1 being the most important
8Ranking Number 1 =Very Important 2=Somewhat Important 3=Not Important
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3.8 Pricing Efficiency of ZIMACE
Results of the analysis of trends in maize grain prices, price correlations, cointegration and Granger-price 
causality are presented below.
3.8.1 Graphical Analysis Of Weekly Trends In Prices
Figure 3 shows real producer prices for maize grain in five different markets. The prices trend upward except 
that the GMB price which has declined since 1997/98 agricultural marketing season. An explanation for the 
declining GMB price is that the GMB prices are administered prices which have been held constant in 
nominal terms for the period under study. The ZIMACE, Mbare and Chikwanha and Chikukwa prices are 
closely following each other as they peak and fall. It is important to note that prices in Chikukwa, Mbare and 
Chikwanha are generally higher than ZIMACE prices with Chikukwa recording the highest prices. This is 
explained by the fact that prices per bucket charged in Chikukwa, Mbare and Chikwanha are reflective of the 
different players in the markets. The Chikukwa, Mhondoro, Guruve, Chikwanha and Mbare markets can be 
thought of as the farmers' retail markets; the ZIMACE is an organised commodity exchange and GMB is a 
terminal wholesale market. Following this argument it is clear that retail prices are generally higher than 
wholesale prices. The general trend in price movements is of rising real producer prices, shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 shows rising nominal producer prices in the ZIMACE, GMB, Mbare, Chikwanha and Chikukwa 
markets. An important factor to note is that both figures 3 and 4 show that prices are lowest around May to 
June which is soon after the harvest, and prices peak around December when there is a shortage in the 
market.
3.8.2 Correlation Analysis
Results of correlation analysis are presented in Tables 14 to 16 below.
Table 14: Nominal Price Correlation Analysis
(ZIMACE, Mbare, Chikwanha, Chikukwa - Weekly Maize Grain Prices, April 1998 to February 1999)
Pairs of Markets Correlation Coefficients
1 Levels
ZIMACE - Mbare 0.943
ZIMACE - Chikwanha 0.948
ZIMACE - Chikukwa 0.916
Mbare Market - Chikwanha 0.929
Mbare - Chikukwa 0.898
Chikwanha - Chikukwa 0.903
Cross correlations are significant in all cases and, highly significant coefficients at around 0.9 for all pairs of 
four price series (ZIMACE, Mbare, Chikwanha and Chikukwa) as shown in Table 14, suggesting an 
instantaneous relationship between the five series at the 0.01 significance level. This can be attributed to 
availability of current price information which influences all markets at the same time. A very close 
relationship exists between ZIMACE and Mbare retail market; ZIMACE and Chikwanha urban market; and 
Mbare and Chikwanha urban market prices. All correlation coefficients were significant at the 1% level. The 
highest correlation coefficient was recorded between ZIMACE and Chikwanha retail market. This indicates 
that the ZIMACE is an important indicator of price not only at the producer levels, but also as maize moves
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towards the consumer in the marketing system.
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Fig 3. Maize Grain Real Producer Prices
(Weekly Price - Apr 1998 to Feb 1999)
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The results indicate that price correlation coefficients for three markets: ZIMACE, Chikwanha and Mbare 
with Chikukwa market are lower than the rest of the pairs. This can be explained by the fact that the 
Chikukwa market is separated from the other markets by distance, hence the correlation coefficient would be 
expected to be lower than that for the other market pairs. Information takes a little longer to be incorporated 
into the Chikukwa market from the rest of the markets.
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Table 15: Nominal Price Correlation Analysis
(GMB, ZIMACE, Guruve, Mhondoro - Monthly Maize Grain Prices, April 1994 to February 1999 )
Pairs of Markets Correlation Coefficients
| Levels
ZIMACE - GMB 0.805
ZIMACE - Guruve 0.885
ZIMACE - Mhondoro 0.933
GMB - Guruve 0.906
GMB - Mhondoro 0.910
Guruve - Mhondoro 0.975
Table 15 above presents results of nominal maize grain price correlation analysis using monthly price
observations for ZIMACE, GMB, Mhondoro and Guruve markets. Firstly, there is a high positive correlation 
between the GMB and ZIMACE price in nominal terms. The results again indicate high price correlations 
close to +0.9 for all pairs of the four price series. The correlation coefficient for the ZIMACE-Mhondoro 
market pair is higher than for the GMB-Mhondoro market pair. This is consistent with expectations as 
smallholders farmers are now increasingly making use ofZIMACE marketing information. Furthermore, the 
correlation coefficient for the ZIMACE-Guruve market pair is lower than that of the ZIMACE-Mhondoro 
pair. This is expected given the proximity of the Mhondoro market to the ZIMACE when compared with
Guruve.
Tables 16 and 17 below show price correlations in real terms.
Table 16: Real Price Correlation Analysis
(ZIMACE, Mbare, Chikwanha, Chikukwa - Weekly Maize Grain Prices, April 1998 to February 1999)
Pairs of Markets Correlation Coefficients
| Levels
GMB - Mbare -0.815
GMB - Chikwanha -0.817
GMB - Chikukwa -0.761
ZIMACE - Mbare 0.841
ZIMACE - Chikwanha 0.818
ZIMACE - Chikukwa 0.875
Mbare - Chikwanha 0.825
Mbare - Chikukwa 0.783
Chikwanha - Chikukwa 0.816
The correlation coefficients for maize grain prices between ZIMACE and the urban markets were around 
+0.8 compared to the correlation coefficients between GMB and urban markets which were around -0.8. The 
negative correlation coefficients imply that an increase in maize grain prices in Chikwanha and Mbare 
markets is associated with a decrease in the GMB price. The positive correlation coefficient is higher for the 
ZIMACE-Chikwanha pair than the ZIMACE-Mbare pair. Reasons for this may be attributed to the fact that 
Mbare is not as organised a market like the Chikwanha market in that smallholder bring their produce to 
Mbare which is the nearest market to where smallholder farmers obtain transport. In most cases smallholder 
farmers are in desperate need for cash such that they sell immediately even if they know that the ZIMACE 
and Chikwanha prices are higher.
The negative correlations indicate a negative association between the prices. Because real price 
correlation coefficients are being considered, the elements of inflation have been removed and one can safely
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conclude that theGMB price is not the right price. The ZI MACE also recorded a high correlation coefficient 
with the rural market (Chikukwa). So an increase in ZIMACE prices is associated with an increase in 
Chikukwa prices. Furthermore the lowest negative correlation coefficient of -0.76 was recorded between 
GMB and Chikukwa.
Table 17: Real Price Correlation Analysis
(GMB, ZIMACE, Guruve, Mhondoro - Monthly Maize Grain Prices, April 1994 to February 1999 )
Pairs of Markets Correlation Coefficients
| Levels
GMB - Guruve 0.681
GMB - Mhondoro 0.691
ZIMACE - GMB 0.357
ZIMACE - Guruve 0.583
ZIMACE - Mhondoro 0.756
Guruve - Mhondoro 0.847
A low positive correlation was recorded between the ZIMACE - GMB market pair. The major reason for the 
low correlation coefficient stems from the fact the GMB price is an administered price and therefore it is 
expected that it does not move closely in relation to free market prices. Comparing results in Table 16 and 
17, it is clear that the correlation of prices is higher for ZIMACE with urban markets than it is with the rural 
markets. The reason is that information is readily available to the urban markets than to the rural markets. 
The ZIMACE disseminates information through the Standard Chartered financial highlights on television and 
this information is not readily available to the rural markets.
3.8.3 Cointegration Tests
The null hypothesis of non-cointegration, was tested against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, by 
estimating cointegrating regressions for the different market pairs using the Ordinary Least Squares method. 
In the second stage the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) testing procedure was conducted on the error terms 
obtained from each of the regression equations of the pairs of markets being investigated. Results of 
cointegration tests of maize grain producer prices changes between the market pairs are shown in Table 18 
below.
Table 18:_____ Results of Cointegration Tests
Market Pair Number of 
Lags
t-
statistic
Augmented 
Dickey Fuller 
Test
R-
square
Durbin Watson 
Statistic
ZIMACE - Mbare 1 -3.18 -3.04 0.842 0.89
ZIMACE - Chikwanha 2 -3.61 -3.50 0.897 0.97
ZIMACE - Mhondoro 2 -3.54 -3.04 0.603 0.88
Mbare - Chikwanha 1 -3.76 -3.50 0.889 1.56
Mbare - Chikukwa 2 -3.53 -3.50 0.870 1.98
Chikwanha - Chikukwa 3 -3.05 -3.04 0.881 1.19
ZIMACE - Guruve 1 -2.48 -3.04 0.784 0.83
ZIMACE-GMB 4 -2.40 -3.04 0.6541 0.68
ZIMACE - Chikukwa 5 -1.18 -3.04 0.873 1.29
GMB - Guruve 0 -2.50 -3.04 0.821 0.56
GMB - Mhondoro 0 -2.61 -3.04 0.828 0.52
Mhondoro - Guruve 0 -2.80 -3.04 0.950 0.53
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Therefore the results of cointegration analysis suggests that the ZIMACE, Mhondoro, Chikwanha and Mbare 
markets are integrated by arbitrage establishing long term relationships. So this implies that all information is 
instantaneously exploited by arbitrage and is reflected by independent identically distributed changes in 
prices. This implies spatial efficiency of the markets pointing out to the convergence of prices in the 
separated markets to one price, thus suggesting that any deviations from the long-run equilibrium observed 
between the markets are only transitory. These findings are important given the confirmed cointegration of 
the markets and so one series may be used to predict the other even if the series is unpredictable on the basis 
of its past.
The last six pairs of markets in Table 18 show no evidence of cointegration. The most important 
finding here is that the ZIMACE and GMB markets are not integrated. Furthermore, ZIMACE is not 
integrated with the Guruve and Chikukwa markets. Whilst the GMB is not integrated with any of the rural 
markets, the results have shown that ZIMACE is integrated with the Mhondoro market. This finding is also 
supported by the correlation analysis which has shown high correlations between Mhondoro and ZIMACE 
markets. The transmission of information between ZIMACE and Mhondoro is more efficient than with the 
other district markets given that Mhondoro is nearer to Harare and thus nearer to ZIMACE than the other 
rural markets considered.
3.8.9 Effects Of Zimace Prices On Market Prices
The cointegration tests suggest there are long run relationships between markets, short run relationships may 
also exist. Bivariate Granger causality tests were performed to investigate the lead-lag relationships between 
the different market pairs. Findings of Granger Causality tests are summarised in Table 19 below, which 
shows in the first column the direction of causation being tested.
3.8.9.1 ZIMA CE To Mbare Market Price Causality
The results on Granger causality between ZIMACE and Mbare prices presented in Table 19 indicate a 
statistically significant F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the ZIMACE price does not Granger cause the 
Mbare price, but the F-statistic is not significant in the reverse. The null hypothesis that the ZIMACE price 
does not Granger cause the Mbare price is rejected whilst the null hypothesis that Mbare price does not 
Granger cause the ZIMACE price is accepted. It is therefore concluded that ZIMACE prices cause Mbare 
price at a test size of 1 percent significance. The leader follower relationship is confirmed in the findings, 
ZIMACE lead the Mbare market in maize grain pricing as revealed by the statistically significant 
unidirectional Granger causality. A significantly transmission of information happens between the two 
markets.
3.8.9.1 ZIMACE to Chikwanha Market Price Causality
The results on Granger causality between ZIMACE and Chikwanha prices indicate a statistically significant 
F-statistic in both directions of causation. The null hypotheses that the ZIMACE price does not Granger 
cause the Chikwanha price and that the Chikwanha price does not Granger cause the ZIMACE price are both 
rejected at a decision rule of 5 percent. This indicates a feedback relationship between the ZIMACE and 
Chikwanha markets, meaning that shocks originating from the postulated central market (ZIMACE) 
influence pricing in Chikwanha and that shocks coming from the Chikwanha market also affect the ZIMACE 
market. Thus this feedback relationship indicates that prices are discovered simultaneously at a lag of one 
week.
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Table 19: G ranger Causality Test (Weekly Maize Grain Prices April 1998 to February 1999)
Hypothesised Direction of Causation F- P- Decisio Confirmed
Statistic value n Direction of
Causation
ZIMACE—> Mbare 
Null Hypothesis:
ZIMACE price does not Granger cause Mbare price 23.174 0.0000 Reject ZIMACE Prices
Mbare price does not Granger cause ZIMACE price 0.004 0.9507 Accept Granger cause 
Mbare Prices
ZIMACE—> Chikwanha 
Null Hypothesis:
ZIMACE price does not Granger cause Chikwanha There is
price 5.929 0.0191 Reject bidirectional
Chikwanha price does not Granger cause ZIMACE 18.578 0.0001 Reject causality between
price the two price series
ZIMACE—> Mhondoro 
Null Hypothesis:
ZIMACE price does not Granger cause Mhondoro price 5.822 0.0202 Reject ZIMACE Prices
Mhondoro price does not Granger cause ZIMACE price 0.544 0.4649 Accept Granger cause 
Mhondoro Prices
Mbare—> Chikwanha 
Null Hypothesis:
Mbare price does not Granger cause Chikwanha 1.044 0.3126 Accept Chikwanha Prices
Chikwanha price does not Granger cause Mbare price 26.602 0.0000 Reject Granger cause 
Mbare Prices
Mbare—> Mhondoro 
Null Hypothesis: There is
Mbare price does not Granger cause Mhondoro price 5.865 0.0197 Reject bidirectional
Mhondoro price does not Granger cause Mbare price 21.91 0.0000 Reject causality between 
the two price series
Chikwanha—> Mhondoro 
Null Hypothesis:
Chikwanha price does not Granger cause Mhondoro There is
price 18.218 0.0001 Reject bidirectional
Mhondoro price does not Granger cause Chikwanha 6.746 0.0128 Reject causality between
price the two price series
3.8.9.2 ZIMA CE to Mhondoro Market Price Causality
Using a decision rule of 0.05, the null hypothesis that the ZIMACE price does not Granger cause the 
Chikukwa price is rejected and the null hypothesis that the Mhondoro price does not Granger cause the 
Mhondoro price is accepted. This indicates a unidirectional Granger $ausality and suggest market leadership 
by ZIMACE. Prices are first discovered in ZIMACE (lead market) and then in the Mhondoro market. This 
result is supported by the market structure and behaviour of ZIMACE participants and the market 
information systems now available to smallholder farmers. The ZIMACE argument that smallholder farmers 
are now using information provided by ZIMACE to come up with their own prices is supported by these 
findings.
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3.8.9.3 Mbare to Chikwanha Market Price Causality
The hypothesis that the Mbare price does not Granger cause the Chikwanha price is accepted at the 1 percent 
significance level whilst the hypothesis that the Chikwanha price does not Granger cause the Mbare price is 
rejected at the same significance level. Therefore unidirectional causality is inferred from Chikwanha to 
Mbare. These results are consistent with the correlation analysis which has shown higher correlation 
coefficients between ZIMACE and Chikwanha than the ZIMACE and Mbare market pairs, as concluded in 
section 6.2 that the Chikwanha market is more organised than the Mbare market.
3.8.9.4 Mbare to Mhondoro Market Price Causality
At a test significance of 5 percent it is concluded that there is bidirectional causality between Mbare and 
Mhondoro. The null hypotheses that*the Mbare price does not cause the Mhondoro price and that the 
Mhondoro price does not cause the Mbare price are both rejected since a significant F-statistic is calculated. 
Given the probabilities for the F-statistics in Table 19, it may be inferred that at lower significance the 
Mhondoro prices are likely to have a greater cause effect on Mbare prices.
3.9.8.5 Chikwanha to Mhondoro Market Price causality
At the significance level of 1 percent both hypotheses are rejected as shown in Table 19 since the F-statistic 
is significant. It is thus concluded that Chikwanha prices cause Mhondoro prices and the reverse is also true. 
Bidirectional causality is inferred.
3.9.9 Price Movements Across The Markets
Econometric tests of symmetric price relationships between the markets having a causal relationship was 
conducted. The model used for estimating the asymmetry hypothesis is given below:
k k
&Mbt = <pl T1 + a liE C lZ t-li + p ii  ECDZt-Ii + e l t ........................ equation 5
i=0 i=0
s>
k k
ACht = <p2T2 + a2iECIZt-2i + ft2i ECDZt-2i + e.2t
i-0 II
k k
equation 6
aMIu  = <p3T3 + a3iECIZt-3i + fl3i ECDZt-3i + e3t........................ equation 7
r=0 i=0
AMbt =  change in the mbare maize grain retail price at time t 
ACht =  change in the chikwanha maize grain retail price at time t 
AMht =  change in the Mhondoro maize grain retail price at time t
ClZt =  cumulative increase in ZIMACE maize grain producer prices up to the time period t
CDZt =  cumulative decrease in ZIMACE maize grain producer prices up to the time period t
<p =  coefficient on trend variable T
ai = coefficient on the current lagged values o f ClZt
Pi =  coefficient on the current and lagged values o f CDZt
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st -  error term
k  =  denotes the lag length on cumulative upward and downward changes in ZIMACE, Chikwanha and 
Mbare market prices
*
The equations above were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares procedures. The symmetric price 
relationships in the ZIMACE, Chikwanha, Mhondoro and Mbare markets were investigated by testing the 
following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis One: The effects of upward and downward ZIMACE price movements on Mbare prices are 
equal
Null Hypothesis Two: The effects of upward and downward ZIMACE price movements on Chikwanha prices 
are equal
Null Hypothesis Three: The effects of upward and downward ZIMACE price movements on Mhondoro 
prices are equal
The test o f price symmetry was based on the equality of the coefficients on upward and downward price 
movements using Wald coefficient restriction tests. The results are presented in Table 20.
Table 20: Price Transmission in Maize Grain Prices between ZIMACE, Mbare,
_______Chikwanha and Mhondoro markets ( April 1998 to February 1999 Prices)
Price Transmission Coefficient Std Error t-value
ZIMACE to Mbare
Constant
Cumulative Increase in ZIMACE Price 
Cumulative Decrease in ZIMACE Price 
R-squared 0.00488377 
F-statistic 0.10552 ( 0.90)
DW Statistic 2.85
Wald Test Statistic 0.21103 ( 0.90)
ZIMACE to Chikwanha
Constant
Cumulative Increase in ZIMACE Price 
Cumulative Decrease in ZIMACE Price 
R-squared 0.0505305
F-statistic 1.1442 ( 0.33)
DW Statistic 2.29
Wald Test Statistic 2.2884 ( 0.32)
ZIMACE to Mhondoro 
Constant
Cumulative Increase in ZIMACE Price 
Cumulative Decrease in ZIMACE Price 
R-squared 0.00192 985 
F-statistic 0.041572 (0.96)
DW Statistic 2.96
Wald Test Statistic 0.083144 (0.96)
80.866 127.40 0.635
0.070062 0.15607 0.449
0.17302 0.48107 0.360
-78.103 107.87 -0.724
-0.12890 0.13214 -0.975
-0.56448 0.40731 -1.386
15.864 186.10 0.085
-0.013960 0.22797 -0.061
-0.12606 0.70270 -0.179
t-prob
0.5290
0.6558
0.7209
0.4730
0.3348
0.1729
0.9325
0.9515
0.8585
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The regression results show that $0.07 of a $1.00 increase in the ZIMACE price is immediately transmitted 
to Mbare whilst $0.17 of a $1.00 decrease in the ZIMACE price is transmitted to Mbare. Therefore price 
transmission from ZIMACE to Mbare is symmetric. The fact that price transmission is symmetric from 
ZIMACE to the Mbare market then it indicates some level of pricing efficiency. ZIMACE price information 
is being transmitted efficiently leading to market efficiency. The results also show that there is symmetry in 
price transmission from ZIMACE to Chikwanha at 10 percent significance level. About $0.13 of a $1.00 
increase in the ZIMACE price is passed on to the Chikwanha market whilst $0.56 of a price decrease in the 
ZIMACE price is transmitted to Chikwanha. Upward and downward price movements in ZIMACE are 
equally passed on to the Mhondoro market. The results from the regression analysis presented in Table 16 
show that $0.01 of a $1.00 increase in price in ZIMACE is immediately transmitted to Mhondoro whilst 
$0.13 of a $1.00 decrease in the ZIMACE price is immediately transmitted to Mhondoro.
4. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY
Three major conclusions can be drawn from this study. The first conclusion is that ZIMACJE is a contestable 
market. Competitor mapping reveals that there is competition among ZIMACE member brokers and between 
ZIMACE and other maize marketing channels. Although there is a small number of participants of the 
ZIMACE market and significant barriers to entry for few firms, the price discovery process results in prices 
that reflect the underlying demand and supply conditions and prices which would have prevailed even if 
there were a large number of buyers and sellers on ZIMACE. Given that prices are discovered at competitive 
levels, consumers will receive the benefits of competition even though there may be fewer brokers 
participating in ZIMACE. Brokers in ZIMACE thus strive to discover competitive prices otherwise they will 
be overtaken by rivals in the market.
The major barrier to entry is the cost of seat on the exchange. However, this is necessitated by the 
exchange needing to generate finance from internal sources to pay operational expenses as the exchange is 
non-profit making. Furthermore an increasing number of people are beginning to find security in ZIMACE 
and they are confident in the knowledge that the deals they strike are transacted at the correct market price. 
The ZIMACE provides a valuable source of transparent market information which the farmer can use to track 
the markets. The information can be used to ascertain future price movements and likely supply and demand 
assessments.
The second conclusion is that ZIMACE market participants engage in price and non-price 
competitive behaviour. Given that ZIMACE member brokers compete for clients they are forced to be 
competitive since the markets for agricultural commodities have now been liberalised and producers look for 
the best price. Most significant has been the changes that have affected marketing which has significantly 
influenced the conduct of participants in the maize grain subsector. Increasingly large volumes of maize 
grain are now traded outside the GMB, with large quantities being traded in private markets. The effective 
and efficient communication of maize grain price signals in the various markets is an important characteristic 
describing the overall operation of the market. Price is the primary mechanism by which various markets are 
linked.
Third, it can be concluded that the ZIMACE performs well as a marketing institution and transmits 
the benefits of its transparent demand and supply-based price discovery and exchange process through the 
maize subsector. High price correlation coefficients obtained indicate relatively low costs and strong 
transmission of information within the marketing system. Cointegration and Granger-Causality results 
further confirm that ZIMACE drives the price discovery process in other markets. These results are a reliable 
indicator of the existence of healthy competition in the markets for maize grain.
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Several implications can be drawn from the study results. The implications apply to Government, brokers 
and smallholder farmers.
5.1 Implications for the Government
The implementation of ESAP in 1992 has led to the acceptance of the principle of free marketing thus the 
decontrol of marketing through the GMB. This has necessitated a mechanism and infrastructure like the 
ZIMACE to market crops that had previously been handled by GMB. In this regard, the knowledge of the 
extent of spatial integration of markets and the nature of price transmission is important in making decisions 
regarding prices and markets to stabilise. The study has indicated the integration of the ZIMACE market with 
the private urban markets as well as with some rural markets. This implies that the Government can influence 
market outcomes including price by using market-based instruments such as dissemination of market 
information especially to outlying rural markets rather than through direct non-market instruments such as 
price controls. This study recommends that Government enact legislation to enforce grain handlers including 
GMB to submit price information to the Agricultural Price Marketing Information system in the Ministry of 
Lands and Agriculture and that this information should be made public.
5.2 Implications for grain commodity brokers
There has been several changes in the agricultural commodity markets due to deregulation. The deregulated 
market is perceived to bring with it suspicion, uncertainty resulting from entry by "fly-by-night" grain 
traders, lack of information, and volatile prices. A commodity exchange like ZIMACE has the capacity to 
contribute to the improved performance in the agricultural commodity markets by providing a framework 
within which traders can operate. This study recommends that brokers improve the transparency in price 
discovery by not engaging in unethical business practices.
5.3 Implications for smallholders
The results of the study have indicated ZIMACE as a leader in the process of price discovery. There exist 
substantial opportunities for smallholders to benefit through the ZIMACE process of price discovery. Given 
that the smallholders only have small volumes to market making them vulnerable to receive low prices, this 
study recommends that the smallholders engage the services of brokers and consolidate their produce in 
different areas to obtain better access to ZIMACE. The study also recommends that the Zimbabwe Farmers 
Union provide leadership to organise smallholders so that they can use ZIMACE to market their produce.
5.4 Implications for ZIMA CE
The process of market reform involves a lengthy transition process from a state-run to a private sector based 
distribution system. The findings of the study show that maize grain markets are imperfectly integrated. 
ZIMACE with its transparent pricing fulfils the crucial role in information provision. The study recommends 
that ZIMACE supports development of infrastructure facilities to effectively link production centres with 
market centres and improve market knowledge by providing more relevant, accurate and timely public 
market information. In addition it is recommended that ZIMACE improves the methods of disseminating 
market information to result in more transparent prices to all market agents including smallholder farmers. 
Timely introduction of infrastructure is important as a tool to stimulate improvement in market channel 
performance. Volatile prices can be taken care of by engaging in forward contracting.
27
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